Members receive permissions based on roles, and accounts, environments, and machines are assigned to people based on their affiliations. Change bindings, adjust strategies, and increase volume execution Such actions are written into the operation log, which can be retrieved by person and time. Administrator accounts can force two-step verification.
A backend account is shared by the entire group, and no one knows who has changed it.
Each person has an account, and actions are recorded under their respective names. The operation log can be retrieved by person and time, eliminating the need to rely on recall and mutual questioning.
The operator can see all the accounts, but in fact he only manages three markets
Accounts, environments, and machines are assigned according to their ownership relationships. Invisible resources will not appear in the list, not just being blocked during operations.
The person is gone, but the account password and API Key are still scattered outside.
Members can be deactivated without deletion, and history is retained. API Keys are managed separately and can be created and invalidated separately according to purpose.
If something goes wrong, we can only rely on guessing. There are no records that can be produced.
There are logs for actions such as binding changes, policy adjustments, script scaling, and permission modifications. There are specific items that can be checked during the review, not everyone's opinion.
Three things are done separately: access depends on login security, what can be done depends on permissions, and what has been done depends on logs. Without one thing, the other two are useless.
Members are created individually and can be enabled or disabled. Disabling the retention of history and logs does not affect the traceability of actions that have taken place.
Combine commonly used permissions into roles and enable new users according to roles. Roles can be set individually by business line or responsibility.
Permissions are granted based on function items, and can be as detailed as whether certain types of operations can be performed. The same person can have different permissions on different resources.
Members and resources are divided into organizations and groups. The ownership of accounts, environments, and machines is clear, and cross-group resources are invisible to each other by default.
Resources indicate the user they belong to. Administrators can switch to the user's perspective when they need assistance in troubleshooting, and the switching action itself is also logged.
Actions such as member changes, permission modifications, account and environment binding changes, and script execution are saved one by one and can be retrieved by person and time.
Members can turn on 2FA, and it is recommended to make it mandatory for management accounts. There is a graphic verification code in the login process, which reduces the success rate of batch password attempts.
Keys are created, viewed and invalidated separately according to purpose. The calls on the program side are recorded separately from the human operations, so that when problems occur, the source can be identified.
Role division and high-risk permission granting must be confirmed by you. Once permissions are granted, logs can only tell you what happened, but cannot prevent it from happening.
First think about what each position should be able to do: who can change account bindings, who can execute scripts in large quantities, and who can only read data. Decide on this role.
Members are created one by one and authorized according to roles. After joining a group, it automatically inherits the account, environment, and machine range visible to the group.
2FA is bound when members log in for the first time. It is recommended that management roles be forced to be turned on, and there is a graphic verification code for the login process.
Actions such as binding changes, policy adjustments, permission modifications, script execution, and user switching are written into the operation log, without requiring additional operations from members.
After personnel changes, promptly deactivate the account and invalidate the corresponding API Key. Regularly check high-risk actions in the log, and don’t wait until something goes wrong to open it for the first time.
Only you can set the boundaries of permissions. The system does not know who in your company should see which customers or which position is qualified to send messages to external parties - this is an organizational decision, not a technical judgment. The default setting is the easiest, but if something goes wrong, the log can restore the process but not the loss.
Write down clearly what the system manages and what you want to manage yourself, so as not to regard the permission system as everything about security.
Environments are classified according to groups, and actions such as creation, binding changes, and agent changes are entered into the operation log.
My machines and managed machines are divided according to the users they belong to, and the allocation and recycling of equipment are recorded.
Script creation and large-scale execution are authorized separately, and API Keys are managed and invalidated separately according to purpose.
The customer list and historical conversations are visible in groups, and only authorized members can take over when transferring.
No. Logs are a means of tracing afterwards, not a means of interception beforehand. It can tell you who changed what and when, but it won't stop it at the moment of change. What really plays the role of interception is permissions: limiting the resources that people can access and the actions they can take within the scope of their responsibilities, and only giving high-risk actions such as exporting customer data, executing scripts in large quantities, and modifying permissions to only a few people. Another part relies on systems, such as deactivating accounts and invalidating corresponding API keys on the day of resignation, regularly reviewing permissions, and conducting spot checks on high-risk actions. Only when logs, permissions, and systems are in place can we have a line of defense. Just looking at logs is equivalent to installing monitoring but not locking.
Permissions are granted based on functional items, and can be as detailed as whether a certain type of operation can be performed, not just whether the module can be entered. At the same time, resources have ownership relationships, and the same person can have different permissions on different account groups. The specific list of permission items can be viewed item by item in the background.
Deactivate rather than delete so that history and operational logs are retained. At the same time, the API Key in his name must be invalidated, and the account and environment he is responsible for must be changed to the new user. It is recommended to change the password for platform accounts that have used shared credentials.
Depends on permission configuration. Administrators can obtain cross-group viewing permissions, and can also use the user's perspective to assist in troubleshooting, but the action of switching users will be logged. If you want certain customer data to be strictly isolated, you can restrict the grouping and permissions and not give cross-group viewing permissions.
Members can turn it on by themselves, but it is recommended to be mandatory for management roles. The specific mandatory policy configuration method is in the background settings. It is recommended to open it at least for roles that can change permissions and execute scripts in large quantities.
Operation logs can be retrieved by person and time in the background. Export method and retention period—, if there are compliance audit requirements, please explain them during the plan communication stage, and confirm the retention strategy as needed.
The consultant will give you a role division suggestion and a control list of high-risk actions based on the position and division of labor of your team.